

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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INFORMATION REPORT

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Federation of Communists of Yugoslavia (FCY)

1. In the FCY and the state administration a great deal of attention is paid to the length of service of Party members. In general, the longer one has served in the Party the greater the privileges he is entitled to receive. However, most of those who joined the Party prior to 1937 have disappeared, either through death or as victims of a Tito purge. A list of these

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"veterans", those who had been purged, appeared in the newspaper Proletar (sic). At the present time there are three classes in the FCY, based on their length of Party service:

- a. Pre-1941. Members of this class constitute the Party elite. A major part of this class is without formal education and obtained their positions by virtue of being war partisans, "prvoborac". All members of the Party's Executive Committee, the CC of the FCY, ministers of the federal and republic governments, high-ranking State Security (UDB) officers, and all top-level commanders in the Yugoslav army belong to this class. In addition to the high salaries of their position, all of these persons have several additional lucrative posts as consultants with various Party or governmental institutions. They have also been given luxurious villas and are supplied with consumer goods at low prices. Members of the elite jealously guard their positions against intruders, e.g., the wife of Peko Dapcevic. Other than official occasions or duties, the elite has no contact with other FCY members or the common people. Until Milovan Djilas' articles were published, the public had heard little about the corruption indulged in by members of this class.
 - b. 1941-1944. The bulk of the "true" Party members joined the FCY in this period. It is this group upon which the regime depends. It consists of outstanding FCY officials, high-ranking army officers, chiefs of various governmental institutions, and UDB officers.¹ Members of this group have some privileges in the form of additional lucrative posts, but their incomes do not permit them to live beyond a level commensurate with their position. Members of this class are jealous of the privileges enjoyed by the elite. The major part of this class has had some pre-war or post-war education. On the other hand, in order to survive and to advance the members of this class are constantly intriguing against each other and denouncing their colleagues to higher authorities. Many in this class are corrupt and devoid of morals. A major part of the embezzlement occurring in Yugoslavia is conducted by members of this class. Moreover, more than half of this class could be bought.
 - c. 1944-1948. The majority of the members of the FCY joined the Party during this period. This class consists of government employees, employees of state enterprises, workers and Party officials in the countryside. Most of this class are regarded as opportunists and are not felt to be trustworthy. They generally receive little money and live close to misery, although some do receive a few special privileges. A major part of this class is disappointed with the regime. The most disillusioned members of the class are the former UDB officers who during the last six months of 1953, while the Party was under the influence of Djilas, lost their positions and privileges by virtue of being demoted to this class.
2. The Party "veterans", those who joined the Party prior to 1937, are not trusted by the regime because some of them, while living in Russia, became friendly with the leading members of the CPSU. Others belonged to party factions which opposed Tito. Some compromised themselves with the pre-war authorities or with the occupation authorities during the last war. The major part of these "veterans" cannot adapt themselves to the new Party line, e.g., abandon orthodox communist doctrine. Consequently, there is a tendency in the regime to remove them from their posts in the FCY and the state administration. The following members of this group are presented as examples of this situation:

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- a. Trisa Kaclerovic - no present Party functions.
- b. Jovan Marinovic - presently a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, but feels that he is being ignored and is dissatisfied.
- c. Vinko Vinterhampen², born in Bosnia, a member of the Party who had been purged by Tito but subsequently reinstated. He was a university professor, an editor of Borba and a correspondent of Borba in the United States. He is presently a correspondent in the U.S. for a Yugoslav newspaper devoted to international politics.
- d. Radivoje Uvalic, an old time communist who took part in the Spanish Civil War. He is presently Yugoslavia's minister to Norway. Before the last war, Uvalic was an assistant professor in Belgrade University and a well known economist. Prior to 1937 he belonged to Gorkic's faction of the Yugoslav Communist Party (CPY) which opposed the appointment of Tito as Secretary-General of the CPY. Since 1937 Tito's relations with Uvalic have not been friendly.

Party Leaders

- 3. The entire authority of the Party and the regime is concentrated in the hands of Tito, Kardelj and Rankovic. In this trio, Tito is the symbol of authority, Kardelj is the brain, and Rankovic is the executive organ.
- 4. The respective ranks of the outstanding leaders of the FCY are as follows:
 - a. Josip Broz - Tito
 - b. Edvard Kardelj
 - c. Aleksandar Rankovic
 - d. Mosa Pijade
 - e. Ivan Gosnjak
 - f. Vladimir Bakaric
 - g. Petar Stambolic
 - h. Miha Marinko
 - i. Milos Minic
 - j. Lazar Kolisevski
 - k. Blazo Jovanovic
 - l. Djuro Pucar-Stari
 - m. Svetozar Vukmanovic-Tempo
 - n. Rodoljub Colakovic
 - o. Koca Popovic
 - p. Ales Bebler

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q. Dobrivoje Radosavljevic

r. Boris Zihel

5. With respect to these rankings, Petar Stambolic is not popular among the leaders of the Party because he and his wife (a former dressmaker) are too ambitious and intrigue too much. Colakovic has been an intimate friend of Tito since pre-war days when both of them served time in various prisons. Ales Bebler has the best chances to advance in the Party hierarchy and administration because Tito and Kardelj like and protect him.³
6. Top-level Party leaders, members of the Party's Executive Committee, are internationalists. The Party's Central Committee, however, is divided into groups along republic lines.⁴
7. Until the beginning of 1953, the FCY had the authority to appoint the chiefs of the Personnel Sections (political commissars) of governmental institutions and state enterprises. The practice was changed in 1953 to an arrangement whereby a vacancy in the office of Chief of Personnel is filled by the best qualified applicant in the enterprise. Thus the job is presumably removed from politics.
8. A special Personnel Department, attached to the office of the President of the Government, Tito, known as the "Secretariat za Personalnu Sluzbu" has the authority to appoint officials of the Federal and Republic governments and officers of other higher governmental institutions. The Central Committee of the parties in the various republics proposes candidates to this office. The chief of this office is appointed by Tito, in his capacity as President of the Government, and his rank is equal to that of a Minister. The present incumbent in this office is Veljko Zekovic. He was born in Montenegro and is a member of the CC FCY. His assistant is Vuksan Ljumovic, also a Montenegrin. Most of the officials and employees in this office are Montenegrins.
9. Officials and employees of the Yugoslav State Secretariat for Foreign Affairs who are also Party members have their own organization called "Klub Ministarstva Spoljnih Poslova", Club of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Members of this club hold weekly meetings. The subjects discussed at these meetings are normally current political and economic problems. Recently, the members of the Club discussed the following problems:
 - a. The factors and elements for overthrowing a regime. This problem arose after the Djilas case and the release of nearly all imprisoned Cominformists. The discussion was based on Lenin's theory of revolution.
 - b. The applicability of Lenin's theory to present-day Yugoslavia. The following conclusions were drawn from this discussion of Lenin's postulates:
 - (1) The Yugoslav people are not presently starving, but they are suffering because of their low standards of living, about 70 per cent under the pre-war standard. The populace is in despair because they are aware that, under the present regime, their situation cannot improve and, being without arms and under the vigilant surveillance of the police, they are

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unable to overthrow the regime. Although this feeling of despair is gradually growing, it is not at such a point where the people are prepared to take part in a revolution. The people dislike the regime, and, with passive obstinate obstruction, are undermining every government attempt to increase production.

- (2) Since the liberation, the regime has consistently failed in its management of the country's economy. Local resources have been exhausted in an effort to industrialize the country. Industrial enterprises are operating irrationally because of incompetent management, unqualified workers, and bureaucracy in their administration. Industrial products are of poor quality and they cannot be sold easily in Yugoslavia because of the low living standards of the populace. Agricultural production is in a desperate state because of governmental land reforms and the passive resistance of the peasants. Nonetheless, the regime is proceeding with its economic policy in the hope that, in time or a new approach, production will increase. In reality, there is no other political life in Yugoslavia except in the FCY which is under complete control of a few leaders. The UDB is very well organized. Every attempt to organize some opposition to the regime or some revolt against the regime in the country, or even some unorthodoxy in the Party, would be easily uncovered and suppressed by the UDB. The regime could completely count on the support of the Army, which is disciplined, well-trained and organized and under the complete control of about 92,000 officers and non-commissioned officers, who are the members of the FCY and under the control of the KOS (counter-espionage unit in the armed forces). With the support of UDB, Army and Party organization, the regime could easily keep the country under control for at least the next ten years, regardless of the fact that it is disliked by the people.
- (3) Any consideration that a serious revolt could be organized by the nationalists in the country is improbable because of UDB surveillance. However, due to the fact that nearly all Cominformists were recently released from the prisons, they have more opportunity to organize some coup d'etat in Yugoslavia with the support of Moscow. After they had been released from the prisons, the Cominformists got various second class posts with government enterprises and in the administration. However, none got a key post nor have any been received back into the FCY, and they are under steady surveillance by the UDB. It may be assumed that they, or a part of them, are organized and that they have contact with the Russian Embassy in Belgrade. They must have many friends and followers among the FCY members who have posts in the administration, Army and even in the UDB. Due to this, and the fact that they are familiar with underground political activity, they have a greater opportunity of organizing a coup d'etat and avoiding being uncovered by the UDB. In addition to the surveillance of these released Cominformists, the UDB has increased the surveillance of the Russian Embassy in Belgrade and its employees, not permitting any of the Cominformists to come in contact with the Embassy and its officials. Because of this UDB surveillance,

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the Russian Embassy has made several unsuccessful protests to the Yugoslav Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Cominformists have no contact with the people because the mass is against the Communists in general.⁵

The Policy of the FCY

10. The Yugoslav regime is practicing the communist system of "border line starvation", called by enlightened Party officials "ivica gladi". In accord with this system the general populace should be kept near starvation and under pressure by the authorities so that people are starving and frightened and will devote all their free time to worrying about how they will obtain food and other consumer goods for themselves and their respective families. Consequently, they become submissive to authority and completely lose any interest in public affairs. The regime applies all the means at its disposal to this end: low wages, high prices of industrial products, compulsory public works, non-paid over-time for the workers engaged in production competition between the various enterprises, high taxes for the farmers, and other means. The main duty of the authority is to watch diligently that the border line of starvation and pressure is not overstepped and, through increasing and decreasing of the starvation and pressure, to keep the people submissive, but not in despair.
11. Most Yugoslavs believe that pressure on them from the regime was reduced in 1953. The Government imported more food from abroad, the farmers' compulsory collectives were liquidated, the prices of food decreased, the wages of the workers and employees were increased. As a result, the people started to believe that the regime was in evolution as there were even some cases where the people assumed some local authority which, until then, was reserved for FCY members only. Under the influence of Djilas' theory, which attracted the major part of the younger Party members, Party conceptions were dangerously undermined, as well as Party discipline and the Party leaders' authority. Since the end of 1953, and particularly after Djilas' theory was condemned by the Central Committee, the leaders were looking for some way to straighten out the undermined conceptions of the Party, to enforce Party discipline and to let the people know that the regime would not tolerate any change in its internal policy.⁶
12. Due to the fact that there was no other way to this end, it was decided to turn back to the old Communist practice - pressure. To give more weight to this decision Aleksandar Rankovic, the head of the UDB, was assigned the responsibility of announcing Party policy. On 29 and 30 March 1954, at the Fourth Plenum of the Central Committee, Rankovic condemned Djilas' theory and other innovations in Party ideology and policy and asked for discipline in the Party and for the fight without any compromise of all reactionary and bourgeois tendencies in the Party and country administration. Rankovic's exposition was endorsed by Tito and accepted by the Committee.
13. As a consequence, the following moves were introduced following the Fourth Plenum:
 - a. Reorganization of basic Party cells will take place. In the future the basic cells will have, instead of a political secretary, a Secretariat consisting of three members. This structure is designed in this fashion so that they can control one another.

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- b. The re-establishment of Party cells within the various enterprises and institutions.
- c. The enforcement of political conferences within the Party organizations and the application of pressure on Party members to attend these conferences. During 1953 Party organizations seldom organized political conferences for their members and when these were held they were attended by only a handful of members. Most members dislike political conferences because the subject of discussion is normally communist doctrine, which is discussed many times in the same vein or in terms which the major part of the audience cannot comprehend.
- d. The enforcement of control over the printing and publishing enterprises.

Edvard Kardelj's New Theory

- 14. According to Kardelj, the passage of time has seen the doctrine of Karl Marx go out of use. Marxism preaches slavery and its principle could not be applied in present society. Until 1948, the Yugoslav regime did everything possible for the complete application in the country of a system based on the principles of Marx, Lenin and Stalin, but the struggle only resulted in confusion in the economy and a lower living standard for the people. After the split with the Cominform, the regime did everything possible to come out of this confusion and to find a new social system which, in practice, would work satisfactorily. However, Kardelj acknowledges that, until now, these efforts resulted only in vagrancy and failure. According to Kardelj, the regime, after ten years of power, could not praise itself for any success in coping with the internal political and economic situation.
- 15. Kardelj considers the present political situation in Yugoslavia to be critical because of the existence of many enemies of the regime. He is more afraid of the enemies in the country than of those abroad. The adversaries of the regime in the country are invisible and stubborn, and many years are needed to root them out. At the same time, the Party members are presently confused and without purified conceptions of socialistic principles while the masses are not sufficiently educated to understand them. The working class is an easy prey to propaganda of the reactionary elements or to that of anarchists. According to Kardelj's views, the masses should be re-educated so that they become conscious of the necessity and advantages of the socialist system. At the same time, some way must be found for the reorganization of production in the country.
- 16. To this end Kardelj, assisted by Alexander Rankovic, is presently working to achieve the following:
 - a. The removal from key posts in the Party organization and the state administration, all veteran Communists who have been unable to adapt themselves to the new conception of Yugoslav Communist ideology, because they are causing more damage to the development of the country's socialism than are the bourgeoisie.
 - b. The reorganization of education in the schools so that new generations will come out of the schools with a clear conception of socialist ideology.

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- c. The direction of propaganda, press, publications, radio and film production to the spreading and suggestion of socialist ideology to the masses.⁷

Government Financial Difficulties

17. The Yugoslav Government is presently in a desperate financial situation due to the fact that the Government has not enough foreign currency to cover Government obligations abroad. In the next few months this situation will only grow worse because the terms are presently expiring for the payment of those claims of foreign subjects, who possessed assets in Yugoslavia, which were previously recognized by the Government. In addition, nearly all Yugoslav clearings with the foreign countries are passive, especially with Germany, whose enterprises do not want to receive any orders from Yugoslav enterprises without deposits in Germany for the value of goods.

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The Next Purge in the FCY

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18. As a result of the Djilas case, many friends and followers of Djilas will lose their positions in the Party and state administration. The number of them is unknown. However, [redacted] rumors that the following members of the FCY Central Committee will lose their posts:

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- a. Mitra Mitrovic
- b. Vladimir Dedijs
- c. Davico, (fnu)
- d. Bora Drenovac, pre-war student, who during the war was the CO of Kosmajski Odred. He was a personal friend of Tito and Djilas.
- e. Dragi Stamenkovic, former war partisan, who in October 1944, together with Drenovac, established the first overt FCY organization in Belgrade.

Leaders of the FCY and Their Conflict with the Cominform

19. The conflict between Yugoslavia and the Cominform in 1948 was genuine. Those Yugoslavs most implicated in the matter were Tito, Kardelj, Djilas, and Rankovic. The seven letters written by the FCY to Moscow on this matter were signed by Tito and Kardelj. Djilas and Kardelj advised Tito and insisted on the split with Moscow. Later, both of them attacked the Cominform and Stalin's interpretation of communist principles and were therefore declared heretics by the Cominform. Rankovic earned the enmity of the Cominform by persecuting Yugoslav Cominformists and uncovering Russian clandestine activities in Yugoslavia. Consequently, any reconciliation between the Cominform and the four leaders of the FCY is impossible. In addition, the Yugoslav leaders are familiar with communist methods and are aware of the fact that, after the split, they have nothing to expect but liquidation from a reconciliation with the Kremlin. There is no possibility, therefore, that any one of the four mentioned Yugoslav leaders would take Moscow's side in the conflict between East and West.

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Cominformists and Cominformism

20. Prior to the Tito-Cominform rift, Moscow organized in Yugoslavia an illegal and underground movement of Cominform sympathizers to overthrow "the fascist regime of Rankovic and other Janizaries". This organization was uncovered, however, by the UDB and most of its members were arrested and later sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. Some of the Cominformists were executed without trial. According to Rankovic, about 40,000 Cominformists were arrested and sentenced.
21. A major part of those imprisoned for Cominformism were sent to serve their prison terms in the Dalmatian Islands where they were employed in the marble mines administered by the government enterprise "Mermer" (Marble). The prisoners were well treated, having to work only six hours per day, while the major part of their time was employed for their re-education. The central UDB sent to the places of imprisonment its best men, versed and familiar with Communist principles, who took part in the discussion of these questions. They held daily conferences, explaining the FCY's new Communist doctrine and the reason for the Cominform-Yugoslav conflict, and attempted to prove to the prisoners that the FCY Communist doctrine is the only true one. Free discussion on these conferences was permitted, and the prisoners had the right to ask questions and express their opinions about various questions. This was only a UDB trap to uncover those prisoners who could not be re-educated.
22. From 1948 to 1953 very few prisoners were released from the prisons, the major part of them being re-educated young men. Some died or were liquidated, while the rest were released from the prisons in the second half of 1953. According to Rankovic's public statement, at the end of 1953 only about two hundred Cominformists were still imprisoned. Before their release from the prisons, each of the prisoners was obliged to sign a declaration stating his previous political error, stating his loyalty to the FCY and the regime and his willingness to help the UDB in uncovering all future Cominformist underground activity. However, none of these persons were received back in the FCY or got any key post in the administration. All of them are surveilled by UDB and their personal records note the fact that they were sentenced as Cominformists.
23. Although the real reason for releasing Cominformists from prison is not known, it is believed that the regime's decision springs from the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations with the Kremlin. Rankovic has hinted several times lately that some of these released Cominformists are trying again to proceed with their underground activities. The following outstanding Cominformists have been released from prison:
 - a. Labud Kusovac, born in Montenegro, a Party veteran who was a member of the FCY Central Committee before Tito. Later, Tito dismissed him from the Party but he was received back again during the last war. Released from prison, he got some low post in the administration.
 - b. Shime Balen, born in Dalmatia, a member of the FCY since 1936, former manager of Tanjug. His present occupation unknown.
 - c. Sokolov, (fnu), former University professor. His present occupation is unknown.
 - d. Netkov, (fnu). His present occupation is unknown.

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- e. Mirko Markovic, 45, educated in Russia, where he was also a University professor; took part in the civil war in Spain, and formerly Tito's friend. After the liberation, he was sent by the Government to the U.S. and Canada to get financial help from the pre-war Yugoslav emigrants and he had much success to this end. Released from the prison, he did not get any post. Nevertheless, he is one of the best Communist economists and he is getting a pension as a retired University professor.
- f. Mita Despotovic, who before the last war was living in Russia, took part in the civil war in Spain. He was a former assistant of the late Kidric. He died or was executed in prison.
24. Although there is no firm information or indication of the number of Cominformists in the Yugoslav army, it is believed that there are many of them undercover.
25. Vrleta Krulj, Chief of the Balkan Section of the State Secretariat of Foreign Affairs, was arrested in November 1953 because his wife, Rosa, a war partisan and a former employee of the Yugoslav Embassy in Athens, was caught in pro-Cominformist activity in Belgrade.
26. Important members of the FCY are sent to court for trial only if they are discovered engaging in Cominformist activity. Less important members of the Party arrested for Cominformism are merely interrogated by the UDB and then forced to sign written pledges concerning their future conduct. They are then released and remain members of the Party.

Panslavism

27. There is presently in Yugoslavia no propaganda nor movement for Panslavism, except among the Cominformists, who are using this idea, among others, for their political propaganda. Prior to 1917, Panslavism was linked to Russia and it had most of its sympathizers among the people of Montenegro because Russia supported this tiny kingdom during its fight for independence. When the regime in Russia changed, the people in Montenegro continued to sympathize with Russia despite its communist nature. Due to this historic sympathy, many Montenegrins joined the Yugoslav liberation army during the last war, and they became members of the FCY. However, the major part of them became Cominformists in 1948.

Yugoslavia's Foreign Relations

28. Informant stated that he has no knowledge about any secret contact or relations with the Soviet Orbit, but that the Yugoslav regime is "ready and looking for the re-establishment of relations" with the Satellites.

Yugoslav
authorities prefer to trade with the Satellites rather than with the West.

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29. If for no other reason than the desperate need for financial assistance, the Yugoslav regime, must, in the near future, join the West. The informant believes that the regime could be forced to give concessions, except grants of political and individual freedom to the Yugoslav populace, in return for financial aid.

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30. Yugoslav efforts in the Near and Far East are motivated by the following:

- a. To secure markets for Yugoslav industrial products which cannot be sold on other markets because of their poor quality. This includes products of Yugoslavia's war industry, particularly those being stockpiled in large quantities and becoming obsolete through the lapse of time.
- b. To develop friendly relations with these states in order to obtain their support for Yugoslav proposals in the United Nations.

31. [redacted] 25X1
 a Yugoslav delegation sent to the U.S. to ask for military assistance [redacted] 25X1
 [redacted] received an order from Belgrade to give false data about the 25X1
 status of the Yugoslav army. When the delegation gave this false data, competent American officers stated that according to their figures the Yugoslavs should not have more than a certain number of men under arms. This American figure was not more than one thousand off the actual number. The American ability to document this discrepancy greatly impressed the Yugoslav delegation and later the Yugoslav Government.

32. The Club of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also discussed the possibility of an agreement between the West and Moscow. They arrived at the following conclusions:

- a. It is improbable that a workable and lasting agreement could be reached between the West and Moscow because the regimes could not co-exist.
- b. Every agreement between the West and Moscow must be unfavorable for the West, and could not last because Moscow does not respect any obligation which would check the spread of communism.
- c. If an agreement is reached, the destiny of the present Yugoslav regime would be in the hands of the U.S. There are hopes that the United States will continue to support the regime because of the favorable strategic position of Yugoslavia and because of the Yugoslav army.

Josip Broz - Tito

33. [redacted] 25X1
 [redacted] Tito [redacted] is intelligent, shrewd, energetic, diligent and 25X1
 sympathetic; but he is also authoritative, impulsive, superficial, selfish, and merciless against his enemies. He has no formal education as such, but a wealth of practical experience. He is a born politician, flexible, accessible to the common people and social. He has the ability to treat successfully the most difficult political problems. He is not a good theorist but is a good organizer. He is not a good orator, but he knows how to speak and deal with the people and to win the masses. He is polished, familiar with social manners and agreeable in society. His imperfections are: drinking, women, jewelry, luxury and extravagant clothing. Some time ago Tito had some liver malady, but in 1953 he was operated on and is now completely healthy. Tito's best friends and collaborators are Kardelj and Rankovic. In Party policy and the affairs of state, Tito always consults Kardelj and normally follows his advice. He has complete confidence in Rankovic. Tito enjoys an indisputable authority in the Party and is worshipped by its members.⁹

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Edvard Kardelj

34. Kardelj is very intelligent, studious, diligent, scrupulous, serious, self-composed and moral. He has a good education and is very erudite. He is completely familiar with the particulars of Communist doctrine. He is the dogmatist of the new Yugoslav Communist doctrine and is a solid doctrinaire. He is a good organizer and is skilled in diplomatic and political matters. He is a good orator but is unsocial. In addition to his other duties, Kardelj is in charge of Party policy, government foreign policy and, since Djilas' removal, is the Party theorist. Kardelj is not very popular among the FCY members because he is reserved, unsocial and not familiar with dealing with people. However, he is very much respected by them, and is considered the brain of the regime.
35. Kardelj and Djilas were never on good terms because Kardelj always considered himself to be the best theorist of the Party. In order to prove his superiority, Kardelj never missed an opportunity to force Djilas into discussion on matters pertaining to the theory of communism. On every occasion of this nature, Kardelj proved to be much better informed than Djilas.

Aleksandar Rankovic

36. Rankovic is intelligent and shrewd. He is self-composed, calm, serious and modest. He has no formal education but is polished and knows how to deal with people. He is one of the best organizers, especially in finding capable, trustworthy collaborators. He is a specialist in intelligence and police matters. The UDB, KOS, 2nd Bureau and JUTOS were organized under his direction. He was a pupil of Beria and has control over all these intelligence services. He is not versed in Communist doctrine. He is not a good orator and avoids discussions and speeches because of his inferiority complex. He is social, amiable and likes to do small services for people. He is popular with the FCY members, but is feared and respected by them for being the head of the UDB. All executive authority and control over the Party organization and the administration is concentrated in his hands. He is an intimate friend of Tito and Kardelj. He was a friend of Djilas but, after Djilas' removal, he terminated this relationship.
37. About three years ago, Rankovic married a second time. His second wife, Smilja, 27, a Slovenian girl, is still a student with the Institute for International Policy and Economy in Belgrade. During the war she was a partisan and is a member of the FCY. She is intelligent, social, amiable, and ready to do services for people. They have a son about two years old. They are living at Dedinje where they have many receptions; one of the most frequent guests is Kardelj.
38. Rankovic was a very close friend of Djilas and because of this relationship Rankovic did not take part in condemning Djilas at the Plenum of the CC of the FCY in January 1954. During Tito's visit to Turkey Rankovic attended the opera. Djilas happened to be at the same opera and it was observed that both of them pretended that they did not see each other. During the same week, [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] Djilas' brother stated [redacted] that Milovan Djilas and Rankovic broke their relationship. Djilas' brother added that he kept advising Milovan Djilas to avoid conflict with other outstanding Communist personalities and to remain on friendly terms with them.

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Mosa Pijade

39. Mosa Pijade wants to retire from the positions he now holds, i.e., President of the Yugoslav Federal Parliament, member of the FCY Executive Committee and member of the Party's Central Committee. Informant was told this by Pijade's personal secretary. Recently, while interviewed by a British journalist, Pijade made a statement that he desires to retire from his position in the Party and in the Administration in order to devote himself to painting. When Pijade's statement was reported to Tito, he bitterly reproached him at an FCY Executive Committee meeting for making this statement without any consultation with other members of the FCY Executive Committee. Tito asked Pijade to revoke his statement because if the statement were to be published, the people in the country and the press abroad would interpret the statement as proof of Pijade's disagreement with other members of the Executive Committee. However, due to the fact that Pijade insisted, a compromise was reached by which Pijade retains all his positions but will be free in the afternoons for his painting.
40. Pijade's office in the Parliament building consists of two rooms; one serves as a waiting room, furnished with the precious antique furniture which was presented to Pijade by the Chinese Communist Government, and is also used as the office of Pijade's personal secretary; the other room is Pijade's office. Since the compromise mentioned above, Pijade is normally working only in the morning in his office, while he devotes the afternoons to painting in his private atelier, which was bought and furnished by the Government. Very much of his time and of his income is spent in tracing and buying of old paintings.
41. Jovan Djordjevic, professor of Belgrade University, is Pijade's principal collaborator in legislative matters.
42. Pijade has never had good relations with Djilas because they always fought each for position in the Party.
43. Pijade is very popular with and respected by the Yugoslav Communists as a Party veteran and their teacher. However, he is not popular with the FCY leaders because he is arrogant, sarcastic and vulgar. According to the general opinion of the Party members, Pijade never had, and never will have, any significant influence in Government affairs because he is a theorist only. In Informant's opinion, Pijade's career in the FCY is completely ended.

Milovan Djilas

44. Djilas' criticisms of the regime caused irreparable damage to Party unity and to the average member's comprehension of Party doctrine. Informant heard from Djilas' brother, who is a student at Belgrade University, that Djilas is writing a novel and translating some of Maxim Gorki's novels. Kardelj was always against Djilas and he previously had warned Tito on several occasions about giving too high authority and responsibility to Djilas.

Ivan Karaivanov

45. Ivan Karaivanov was an official with the Institute of International Politics and Economy in Belgrade until 1 January 1954. Before the war, Karaivanov was living in Russia where he was a member of the Comintern. During that

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time, he was very often sent by the Comintern on missions to China, Austria, Rumania, and Bulgaria, and has known the major part of the present Communist leaders in the Satellite countries. Karaivanov was a friend and collaborator of the late Bulgarian President Dimitrov. He is a friend of Tito. Presently Karaivanov holds the following posts in Yugoslavia:

- a. Deputy to the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia, elected by the voters of Dimitrovgrad district (formerly Caribrod);
- b. Member of the FCY Central Committee;
- c. Honorary official of the Institute of International Politics and Economy;
- d. UDB advisor regarding Bulgarian matters, reporting directly to Rankovic.

Vladimir Rolovic

46. General Vladimir Rolovic, born in Montenegro, is about 40 years old, a war partisan, pre-war member of the FCY, former member of the Montenegrin Central Committee and former member of the Cadre Section of the FCY Central Committee, and presently in charge of personnel of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He was appointed to this post by the UDB. All appointments, dismissals, promotions, assignments of the officials and employees of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs must have his approval and bear his signature. He is in charge of the officials' and employees' personal records. All engagements, appointments, and assignments of agents for the intelligence service abroad have to pass through his hands and have his approval. Rolovic is intelligent, serious, calm and diligent.

Lazar Kolisevski

47. Lazar Kolisevski, President of the Macedonian Government, was married to Ljiljana Cakolovska, born in Bitolj. About two years ago, his wife left him and, in spite of all his proposals, she declined to return to his home. Later Kolisevski met a girl Trebinjac (fnu), 22, student of Skoplje University, daughter of the late Trebinjac, who was a Communist and a friend of Sreten Zujovic and who was married to a French woman. Kolisevski asked his wife to divorce him; she agreed on condition that she obtain from Kolisevski a passport and permit to leave Yugoslavia for France. Kolisevski consulted Rankovic about the matter and got permission from Rankovic to give his wife the passport for travel to France. In addition, he got permission from Rankovic to marry Miss Trebinjac.

Kosta Papadatos

48. Kosta Papadatos, former commanding officer of the militia in Piraeus and Kokonia, and former major with the Yugoslav Army, is presently living with his wife in Belgrade. He has the following positions in Belgrade:
- a. Honorary collaborator with the Institute of International Politics and Economy, in charge of Greek matters;
 - b. Collaborator with the UDB;
 - c. One of the editors of the Belgrade radio program for Greece.

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Blagoje Neskovic

50. Neskovic was removed from all Party functions because he steadily argued that the FCY should not break relations with the Cominform. Neskovic was of the opinion that Yugoslav propaganda against the Cominform should not go so far because there was still hope that the differences between the FCY and the Cominform could be settled. He was too insistent about this question so that in the end he was removed as a sympathizer of the Cominform. Petar Stambolic, a member of the FCY since 1937 and then President of the Serbian Government, mostly insisted on Neskovic's removal from Party functions.

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4. Comment: [redacted] it is more than a coincidence that the three top men are from different republics.

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5. Comment: [redacted] the Cominformists do constitute an actual danger to the present regime because of their contact with the workers, their ability to mask their subversive activities from the UDB, and because of the inability of the present leadership of the Party to establish equal rights for all members of the Party, a situation which would be exploited by the Cominformists at the proper time.

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6. Comment: [redacted]
[redacted] Djilas' campaign against privileges and bureaucracy won him the sympathies of [redacted]
[redacted] the second and third classes of FCY members.

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


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9. Comment:  there are no power factions within the PCY. According to general opinion in the Party, none of the communist leaders are worthy enough or have enough authority to replace Tito. In the event of Tito's demise, the only path to the preservation of the Party as a united body would be the conclusion of an agreement between Kardelj and Rankovic, the former being the presumptive successor to Tito, the latter complete control over the Party organization and administration by virtue of his position as chief of the security police.

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